When your browser connects to an HTTPS site, one of the first things it sends is the Server Name Indication: the plain-text name of the site it wants. TLS encryption protects the content of the session, but the SNI goes out in the clear — the network needs it to route you to the right certificate.
Why censors love it
SNI makes blocking trivial: look at the field, compare with the list, cut the connection. No decryption required. It is the same mechanism a corporate filter uses, and the same one a national censor uses — only the list differs.
What blocking looks like to you
The site either never opens or dies a few seconds in. The network says nothing about why: from its point of view, the connection simply was not established.
How a tunnel uses SNI
An anti-censorship tunnel puts a different name into this field — the name of a large, boring, definitely-not-blocked service. The censor sees an ordinary connection to an ordinary host. The real destination is negotiated later, inside the encrypted session, where the censor cannot read.
This is what “SNI disguise” means: not hiding the field, but putting the right name into it.